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Local Government Law
by Kirk Fjelstul*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article reviews Georgia appellate decisions presenting new or
instructive issues related to local government law during the survey
period from June 1, 2013 to May 31, 2014.1
II. IMMUNITY
2
Overruling IBM v. Georgia Department of Administrative Services
and setting new precedent, the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia
Department of NaturalResources v. Centerfor a Sustainable Coast,Inc.3
held that sovereign immunity is a bar to injunctive-relief claims at
common law.4 The plaintiff, Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. (the
Center), sought declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the
Shore Protection Act (the Act)5 did not authorize the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and its officials to issue "Letters of
Permission" (LOPs) for land-alteration activities along the coast.' The

*

Acting Executive Director, Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA).

Adjunct Professor, Georgia State University Law School. Drake University Law School
(J.D., 1988); Emory University Law School (LL.M., 1989). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Special thanks to the following for guidance in identifying important topics or for input
on specific issues: G. Joseph Scheuer, Assistant General Counsel, Association County
Commissioners of Georgia; Ken Jarrard, Jarrard & Davis, LLP; Susan Moore, General
Counsel, Georgia Municipal Association; and James E. Elliott, Jr., City Attorney, Warner
Robins, Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia local government law during the prior survey period, see
Kirk Fjelstul, Local GovernmentLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 65 MERCER L. REV.
205 (2013).
2. 265 Ga. 215, 453 S.E.2d 706 (1995).
3. 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).
4. Id. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 185-86.
5. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-230 to -248 (2012).
6. Ga. Dept of Natural Res., 294 Ga. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 186.
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supreme court granted certiorari from Center for a Sustainable Coast,
Inc. v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources7 in part to consider
whether the Georgia Court of Appeals "erred by finding that sovereign
immunity was no bar to injunctive relief at common law."
The court of appeals had ruled that the trial court improperly relied
on sovereign immunity to dismiss the injunctive-relief claims.9 The
court reasoned that sovereign immunity was not available for injunctiverelief claims based on ultra vires or illegal conduct.'i The court of
appeals relied on IBM and concluded that "a governmental entity cannot
cloak itself in sovereign immunity while performing illegal acts to the
detriment of its citizens.""
The supreme court in IBM recognized a legal fiction by creating an
exception to sovereign immunity for injunctive-relief claims concerning
acts conducted outside of the scope of lawful authority. 2 Sovereign
immunity barred injunctive claims if the asserted acts were legal, but
the immunity exception allowed the claims to proceed if the asserted acts
were not legal." Immunity exceptions, as interpreted in IBM, are often
used by courts to avoid the harsh consequences of immunity that result
from acts conducted outside the scope of authority.'4 An exception is
different than a waiver in that an immunity waiver is expressly
authorized by the Constitution of the State of Georgia,15 but it can only
be applied by the Georgia General Assembly.18 The court in IBM
common law judicial exceptions that were
reasoned that it could create
17
not considered waivers.
The supreme court in Georgia Department of Natural Resources
reversed the holding of the court of appeals and overruled IBM,
concluding that the IBM analysis was "unsound."8 The court reasoned
that the 1991 amendment to the constitution 9 was clear and did not
leave flexibility for judicial exceptions to immunity.2 0 The 1991

7. 319 Ga. App. 205, 734 S.E.2d 206 (2012).
8. Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 594, 755 S.E.2d at 186.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 319 Ga. App. at 209, 734 S.E.2d at 209.
Id.
Id.
265 Ga. at 216, 453 S.E.2d at 708.
Id.
Id.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. IX.
Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 599, 755 S.E.2d at 189.
265 Ga. at 216-17, 453 S.E.2d at 708-09.
Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 597, 755 S.E.2d at 188.
Ga. H.R. Res. 777, Reg. Sess., 1990 Ga. Laws 2435.
Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 598-99, 755 S.E.2d at 189.
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amendment extended immunity to the state and its departments and
agencies, which "can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly."21 In IBM, the court had minimized the 1991 amendment,
contending that
it was simply intended to change the insurance waiver
22
of immunity.

The court in IBM also incorrectly contended that there is at least one
other example of a similar judicial exception: nuisance claims. 28

The

court in GeorgiaDepartmentof NaturalResources concluded that there
is no such judicially-created immunity exception.' Instead, immunity
is simply not applicable to nuisance claims because the constitution
requires just compensation for taldngs.' Finally, the court concluded
that the court in IBM wrongly used precedent that either predated the
constitutional ratification of immunity in 1974 or failed to consider the
impact of that ratification. 6
Although the court in Georgia Department of Natural Resources
concluded that sovereign immunity bars injunctive-relief claims against
the state and its officers in their official capacities, it noted that relief
may be available against the officers in their individual capacities.27
Injunctive relief would also be permitted if there is a specific waiver by
act of the General Assembly, which the court concluded did not exist in
the present case.28
It should be noted that this case, while initiated against a state
agency rather than a local government, does have local government
application. Counties are political subdivisions of the state, and as such,
the 1991 amendment, which formed the basis of the court's decision,
applies to counties as well as the state. 9

21. Id. at 598, 755 S.E.2d at 189 (emphasis omitted) (quoting GA.-CONST. art. I, § 2,
para. IXe)).
22. Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 599, 755 S.E.2d at 190; see IBM, 265 Ga. at
217, 453 S.E.2d at 708-09.
23. See Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 600, 755 S.E.2d at 190; IBM, 265 Ga. at
217, 453 S.E.2d at 709.
24. Ga. Dep't of NaturalRes., 294 Ga. at 600, 755 S.E.2d at 190.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 601, 755 S.E.2d at 190-91.
27. Id. at 603, 755 S.E.2d at 192.
28. Id.
29. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 746, 452 S.E.2d 476, 478-79 (1994).
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CHARTERS

The court of appeals in Kautz v. Powell3° interpreted the express and
supplementary powers contained in the City of Snellville's charter as it
addressed the mayor's authority to terminate the city attorney's
employment.'
Section 3.12 of the charter3 2 expressly authorized the
mayor to appoint the city attorney but was silent about the authority to
terminate. 33 The mayor contended in her complaint that the express
authority in the charter to hire carried the implicit authority to
terminate.3
The court reasoned, however, that the plain and unambiguous
language in section 2.16 of the charter3 5 vested all power with the city
council that was not expressly delegated elsewhere.36 Section 2.16
provides, "Except as otherwise provided by law or this [ciharter, the city
council shall be vested with all the powers of government of this city."37
It is not allowable, therefore, for the court to construe unambiguous
language in favor of additional implicit authority.38 Since there is no
express authority for the mayor to terminate the city attorney's
employment, the court upheld the trial court's ruling that the mayor did
not have authority to terminate the city attorney.39
The dissent argued that the majority ignored the longstanding rule
that where an official's tenure is not prescribed by law, the power to
terminate is incident to the power to appoint.' The majority responded that it was not construing or interpreting the charter because the
charter in Kautz was unambiguous.4' The majority further pointed out
that the language in Bailey v. Dobbs42 relied on by the dissent was
mere dicta in that the charter in that case gave the city manager the

30. 326 Ga. App. 816, 755 S.E.2d 330 (2014), cert. granted, No. S14C1161, 2014 Ga.
LEXIS 690 (2014).
31. Id. at 817-18, 755 S.E.2d at 331.
32. SNELLVILLE, GA., CHARTER § 3.12 (2002).
33. Kautz, 326 Ga. App. at 816 n.1, 755 S.E.2d at 330 n.1. The charter states, "The
mayor shall appoint a city attorney...." Id. (quoting SNELLVILLE, GA., CHARTER § 3.12).
34. Id. at 816, 755 S.E.2d at 330.
35. SNELLVILEE, GA., CHARTER § 2.16 (2002).
36. Kautz, 326 Ga. App. at 816-17, 755 S.E.2d at 330-31.
37. Id. at 816, 755 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting SNELLvILEE, GA., CHARTER § 2.16).
38. Id. at 817, 755 S.E.2d at 331.
39. Id. at 817-18, 755 S.E.2d at 331.
40. Id. at 819, 755 S.E.2d at 332 (Branch, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 817 n.5, 755 S.E.2d at 331 n.5 (majority opinion).
42. 227 Ga. 838, 183 S.E.2d 461 (1971).
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express power to appoint and remove employees, and the court did not
use implicit power as an argument in support of its decision.43
IV. MANDAMUS
A.

Bibb County v. Monroe County
The case of Bibb County v. Monroe County" reminds us about the
limits of mandamus in matters that are legislative or political in nature.
Sections 36-3-20 to -27 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.)4 5 establish the process for resolving jurisdictional boundary
disputes between counties.46 By the time the case reached the Georgia
Supreme Court, the boundary dispute had been through a nearly tenyear process. It followed the administrative process set out in O.C.G.A.
§§ 36-3-20 to -27. A grand jury made a presentment of the dispute, and
the governor appointed a surveyor. The surveyor prepared and filed a
survey and plat with the secretary of state, recommending final
boundary lines. Bibb County filed exceptions to the survey and Monroe
47
County responded with a defense.
The secretary of state referred the dispute to the Office of State
Administrative Hearings, and after a three-day hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended the acceptance of the survey and plat.
The secretary of state heard additional arguments and visited the
disputed area. The secretary of state then rejected the survey and left
the boundary undetermined.48
Monroe County filed an action for judicial review in superior court
against the secretary of state, but that action was dismissed as nonreviewable and was not appealed. 49 Once the action was dismissed,
Monroe County filed a mandamus action. The trial court granted the
mandamus petition after a hearing and ordered the secretary of state to
record the survey filed by the appointed surveyor, thereby recognizing
the final boundary as the one prepared by the surveyor.5 °

43. Kautz, 326 Ga. App. at 817 n.5, 755 S.E.2d at 331 n.5; see also Bailey, 227 Ga. at
839, 183 S.E.2d at 463.
44. 294 Ga. 730, 755 S.E.2d 760 (2014).
45. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-3-20 to -27 (2012).

46. Id.
47. Bibb Cnty., 294 Ga. at 730-32, 735, 755 S.E.2d at 763-64, 765.

48. Id. at 731, 755 S.E.2d at 764.
49. Id. The form of the action and the reason it was not appealed is unclear because
it is not part of the record. See id. at 735 n.2, 755 S.E.2d at 766 n.2.
50. Id. at 731-32, 755 S.E.2d at 764.
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It is the secretary of state's duty to ascertain the boundary line: "Upon
the hearing, the Secretary of State shall determine from the law and
evidence the true boundary line in dispute between the respective
counties."5' Bibb County and the secretary of state contended on
appeal that the nature of establishing county52boundary lines is purely
political and is not reviewable by mandamus.
Mandamus is a remedy for government failure to perform a clear duty,
but a writ of mandamus is only available if two elements are met: (1) no
other adequate remedy is available, and (2) there is a clear legal right
to the relief.53 The court addressed both elements at length.
(1) No Adequate Remedy. If there is another avenue for pursuing
relief that is "equally convenient, complete and beneficial," mandamus
is not available as a remedy.' The secretary of state contended that,
because Monroe County could secure another grand jury presentment,
a remedy other than mandamus was available.5 5 The court disagreed
and reasoned that starting the process over could not be considered
equally convenient, complete, and beneficial.56 The process had already
taken nearly ten years and cost substantial sums.5 The court concluded that mandamus was available because it was the only "practicable"
method for obtaining relief.5"
(2) Clear Legal Right. A clear legal right to relief compels performance of a "public duty that an official or agency is required by law to
perform."5 9 A clear legal right exists "either where the official or
agency fails entirely to act or where, in taking such required action, the
official or agency commits a gross abuse of discretion. ' ° Where the law
vests the agency or official with discretion to perform an action,
mandamus is not available because there is not a clear legal right to
performance of the act.61 Even if mandamus is available to compel
some action, it cannot be used to "prescribe how that action is taken or
to preordain its result." 2

51. O.C.G.A. § 36-3-24 (2012).
52. Bibb Cnty., 294 Ga. at 733, 755 S.E.2d at 765.
53. Id. at 734, 755 S.E.2d at 766.
54. Id. (quoting N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 125, 128, 453 S.E.2d 463,
466 (1995)).
55. Id. at 735, 755 S.E.2d at 766.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 735, 755 S.E.2d at 767.
62. Id. at 736, 755 S.E.2d at 767.
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The court concluded that there was a clear legal right under the
statute to file a protest challenging the appointed surveyor's plat, a clear
legal right to have the secretary of state determine the true boundary,
and a clear legal right to have the secretary of state record the survey
establishing the boundary line.6" There was no clear legal right to a
particular result because the secretary of state had the discretion to
make the determination. 6
B.

Scarborough v. Hunter
Scarborough v. Hunter (ScarboroughII)65 is another mandamus case
decided by the supreme court during the survey period, and it considered
the extent of the court's review when mandamus is brought based on
allegations of gross abuse of discretion.66 The plaintiffs, property
owners along Winding Bluff Road, brought actions seeking mandamus
and a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Stephens County
Board of Commissioners, which would direct the county to repair the
road and prevent a county commission vote to consider abandoning the
road.67
The trial court in the first Scarborough v. Hunter (Scarborough1)68
entered a TRO against the county commission directing it not to hold a
hearing or take action abandoning the road.69 The Georgia Supreme
Court in Scarborough I reversed the trial court and rescinded the
TRO.7 ° The supreme court held that the trial court's duty was to
review discretionary acts, not to prevent the exercise of discretion.7'
Thereafter, the county held a public hearing and considered evidence
on the issue of road abandonment. 2 The board of commissioners voted
to accept the staff's recommendation to abandon the road in accordance
with the O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) 73 abandonment standard. The plaintiffs
then amended the mandamus complaint, challenging the board of
commissioners' decision.74

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 737, 755 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 739, 755 S.E.2d at 769.
293 Ga. 431, 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).
See id. at 432-33, 746 S.E.2d at 122.
Id. at 431-32, 746 S.E.2d at 121.
288 Ga. 687, 706 S.E.2d 650 (2011).
Scarborough I, 293 Ga. at 432, 746 S.E.2d at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (2012).
Scarborough11, 293 Ga. at 432, 746 S.E.2d at 121.
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The trial court held a bench trial and entered an order, concluding
that the county's abandonment decision was arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and not in the best public interest.75 It set aside
the abandonment decision and entered a mandamus order directing the
board of commissioners to repair and maintain the road in "as good a
condition as same was initially accepted." 6 The supreme court in
Scarborough H once again reversed the trial court's ruling, this time
reversing the mandamus order."
Mandamus is ordinarily available as a remedy for "failure of a public
official to perform a clear legal duty."78 It is also available, however,
to review acts of discretion "where the exercise of that discretion has
been so capricious or arbitrary as to amount to a gross abuse."79
The county has a duty to maintain roads on its county system, but
O.C.G.A. §§ 32-7-1 to -580 provides a statutory process for abandonment.81 The statutory standard applied by the county from O.C.G.A.
§ 32-7-2(bXl) was whether the road has for any reason "ceased to be
used by the public to the extent that no substantial public purpose is
served by it or that its removal from the county road system is otherwise
in the best public interest."82
The court noted that all of the issues associated with road abandonment are matters of discretion for the governing authority." The trial
court's review of the decision should be whether the board's "judgment
on these matters was so arbitrary and capricious that it amounted to a
'gross abuse of ...

discretion."'"

It is "not whether, in the court's

judgment, the Road had 'ceased to be used by the public to the extent
that no substantial public purpose is served by it or that its removal
' 5
from the county road system is otherwise in the best public interest."'
The supreme court based its determination on whether there was any
evidence to support the county commission's decision, not the trial
court's decision.86

75. Id. at 432-33, 746 S.E.2d at 122.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 439, 746 S.E.2d at 126.
78. Id. at 434-35, 746 S.E.2d at 123.
79. Id. at 435, 746 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Bd. of Commn'rs. of Rds. & Revenues of
Walton Cnty. v. Robinson, 160 Ga. 816, 818, 129 S.E. 73, 74 (1925)).
80. O.C.G.A. §§ 32-7-1 to -5 (2012).
81. Scarborough H, 293 Ga. at 433-34, 746 S.E.2d at 122-23.
82. Id. at 436, 746 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(a) (2007)).
85. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1)).
86. Id.
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The court reviewed the record of the public hearing and held that
there was evidence to support the board of commissioners' decision to
abandon the road. 7 The court recognized that there was conflicting
evidence.' The board was entitled to conclude, however, that the cause
of the road's failure was, in part, the result of defective construction by
the private developer who built the road, that it could cost more than
$600,000 to repair the road, and that there was very little public use of
the road beyond that of the developer or a few property owners.8 9 As
a result, the court held that there was no basis for the trial court to find
that the decision to abandon the road was arbitrary or capricious and a
gross abuse of discretion.90 The trial court's finding that abandonment
of the road was not in the best public interest "inappropriately substituted the court's view of the evidence and the public interest for that of the
Board." 1
The court also questioned, but did not overrule, the rationale of
Cherokee County v. McBride," a case relied on by the plaintiffs.93 The
case was cited for the proposition that the county cannot avoid its duty
to maintain a county road by letting it fall into disrepair to the point of
becoming impassable and then abandoning it based on non-use.94 The
court distinguished the present case from McBride because there was
evidence that the road at issue in the present case was failing due to
defective design and construction.9 5 The court noted, however, that the
statutory standard for abandonment had been amended since McBride
was published, potentially undermining its rationale.98
A 2010 amendment added a new standard for abandonment that is not
connected to public use or non-use of the road.97 The amendment
added the phrase "or that its removal from the county road system is
otherwise in the best public interest."98 Since the court found the
present case was one of defective design and construction rather than
neglect, however, it did not decide whether to overrule McBride.99

87. Id. at 436-37, 746 S.E.2d at 124-25.
88. Id. at 437, 746 S.E.2d at 125.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 437-38, 746 S.E.2d at 125.

91. Id. at 438, 746 S.E.2d at 125.
92. 262 Ga. 460, 421 S.E.2d 530 (1992).
93.
94.
95.

Scarborough 11, 293 Ga. at 438, 746 S.E.2d at 125.
Id.
Id.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 438-39, 746 S.E.2d at 126.
Ga. S. Bill 354, Reg. Sess. (2010).
Id. § 1.
Scarborough11, 293 Ga. at 439, 746 S.E.2d at 126.
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C. Burke County v. Askin
The supreme court decided a third mandamus case, Burke County v.
1
Askin (Burke County II),1"' during the survey period. "' Five roads
in Pineview Subdivision were dedicated to and accepted by Burke
County in 1962. Three of the five roads were constructed as unpaved.
One of the three, Frances Avenue, was the main road in the subdiviAlthough the road was partially constructed, it was left
sion.10
08
The two remaining
unfinished for "the last few hundred feet."
streets were never constructed.'
The court in Burke County II considered the trial court's writ of
mandamus that required the county to complete the unfinished portion
of Frances Avenue.0 5 In the first Burke County v. Askin (Burke
County I),106 the supreme court vacated the trial court's writ of mandamus, which ordered the county to complete and maintain the road, and
remanded for rehearing.0 7 The court held in Burke County I that,
although the issue of road maintenance and construction was a matter
10 8
On
of discretion, the trial court failed to articulate a standard.
remand, the trial court was directed to use a standard of0 9"arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable," or gross abuse of discretion.
On remand, the trial court once again issued a writ of mandamus
ordering the county to repair, construct, and maintain Frances Avenue,
this time applying the proper standard."0 The standard of review on
appeal of the county's duty to maintain a road is "Whether the superior
court manifestly abused its discretion and erred in granting mandamus
relief.""' Grant or denial of mandamus relief is "largely in the
discretion of the presiding judge." 12

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

294 Ga. 634, 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).
Id. at 635, 755 S.E.2d at 748.
Id. at 635, 755 S.E.2d at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634, 755 S.E.2d at 748.
291 Ga. 697, 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012). There is also a third case, this time in the

Georgia Court of Appeals. The court of appeals case addressed related issues in the same
development that were litigated in Columbia County. See generallyBurke Cnty. v. Askins,
327 Ga. App. 116, 755 S.E.2d 602 (2014).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Burke County 1, 291 Ga. at 701, 732 S.E.2d at 419.
Id.
Id.
Burke County H,294 Ga. at 636, 755 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 637, 755 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 636-37, 755 S.E.2d at 750.
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This appellate review standard is different from that applied in
Scarborough II. That case addressed the statutory authority for road
abandonment, which provides a statutory process that is left to the
discretion of the governing authority."3 The present case addressed
the duty to maintain roads on the county system."' The county has
a statutory duty to maintain its roads according to specific standards,
and the court may enforce that duty through mandamus. 115
The court in Burke County H upheld the trial court's writ of mandamus, ruling that there was evidence to support the finding that failure
to complete the road was arbitrary."' Although the county contended
that it had the discretion to direct road funds in the most efficient and
effective manner, the trial court found that there was no evidence in
support of that assertion. Instead, it found that decades of neglect were
a result of the mistaken belief by the county that the road was private
rather than public." 7
V. ANTE LITEM NOTICE
In GreaterAtlanta Home Builders Ass'n v. City of McDonough,"' the
Georgia Court of Appeals revisited the issue of whether attorney fees are
subject to the requirements of ante litem notice." 9 O.C.G.A. § 36-335(a)120 bars certain claims against municipal corporations without prior
written notice: "No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money
damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries to
person or property shall bring any action against the municipal
corporation for such injuries, without first giving notice as provided in
subsection (b) of this Code section."' 2 ' O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(b).. 2 describes the notice requirements:
Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a claim
against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person, firm, or
corporation having the claim shall present the claim in writing to the
governing authority of the municipal corporation for adjustment,

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 637 n.4, 755 S.E.2d at 750 n.4.
Id.
See id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b) (2007); O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41 (2012).
Burke County II, 294 Ga. at 638-39, 755 S.E.2d at 751.
Id. at 637-38, 755 S.E.2d at 750-51.
322 Ga. App. 627, 745 S.E.2d 830 (2013).
Id. at 627, 745 S.E.2d at 830-31.
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(a) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
O.C.G-A. § 36-33-5(b) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
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nearly as practicastating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as
2
ble, and the negligence which caused the injury."
City of McDonough involved a class action lawsuit brought by the
Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, as a representative of the
homebuilders, for the return of impact fees and for attorney fees and
costs. Once the class was certified, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, but it denied
fees and costs based on the failure to provide
the request for attorney
124
ante litem notice.

The plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorney fees and costs, and the
2
court of appeals reversed." In doing so, the court overruled Dover v.
City of Jackson,25 which held that attorney fees and costs were subject
127
The court reasoned that O.C.G.A.
to the ante litem restrictions.
§ 36-33-5 is in derogation of common law because common law does not
12
As a result, the
require notice prior to initiating legal action.
of Statesboro v.
City
on
relying
statute must be strictly construed, and
129
to personal
only
applies
Dabbs, the court recognized that the statute
130
the statute
of
Application
injury and property damage tort claims.
requires a determination of whether there is a claim for injuries to
person or property, not just money damages."'
The damages in this case were for reimbursement of development
2
impact fees and attorney fees and costs."1 Since none of the claims
were for injury to person or property, the court held that the ante litem
3
restrictions in O.C.G.A. 36-33-5 did not apply." The court specifically
held that the plaintiffs were not required to give ante litem notice in
order to seek attorney fees." 4
5
The court then overruled Dover,"1 the authority relied on by the
trial court for its holding that attorney fees and costs were barred by the

123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. City of McDonough, 322 Ga. App. at 627, 745 S.E.2d at 830-31.
125. Id. at 627, 745 S.E.2d at 831.
126. 246 Ga. App. 524, 541 S.E.2d 92 (2000).
127. City of McDonough, 322 Ga. App. at 629-30, 745 S.E.2d at 832; see alsoDover, 246
Ga. App. at 526, 541 S.E.2d at 94.
128. City of McDonough, 322 Ga. App. at 629, 745 S.E.2d at 831.
129. 289 Ga. 669, 715 S.E.2d 73 (2011).
130. City of McDonough, 322 Ga. App. at 629, 745 S.E.2d at 831-32.
131. Id. at 629, 745 S.E.2d at 832.
132. Id. at 627, 745 S.E.2d at 830.
133. Id. at 629, 745 S.E.2d at 832.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 629-30, 745 S.E.2d at 832.
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1
plaintiffs' failure to serve a proper ante litem notice. "' Dover incorrectly concluded that a claim for attorney fees and costs, although
ancillary to the claims for equitable relief in a zoning case, was a claim
The court in City of McDonough held that conclusion
for damages.'
was contrary to both the duty of the court to strictly construe statutes
that are in derogation of common law and the language of O.C.G.A. § 3633-5, which limits applicability of the statute to damage claims arising
from injury to person or property.13

VI.

TAXATION

In Thrner County v. City of Ashburn,"9 the Georgia Supreme Court
struck down the 2010 amendment 140 to the Local Option Sales Tax
(LOST) Act. 14' LOST is generally a special district local tax, whose
special district boundaries correspond to the 159 counties. 142 It is a
joint tax, with the proceeds distributed to the county and qualified
municipalities within the county based on terms negotiated in a jointlyexecuted certificate that is filed with the revenue commissioner. 4 '
Prior to the 2010 amendment, the court held that the process in the
LOST Act for negotiating the distribution of tax revenue was voluntary,
and therefore, not an unlawful delegation of legislative taxing authority
to the revenue commissioner.'" The requirement for filing a joint
certificate merely allowed the revenue commissioner to distribute tax
proceeds. 145
The difficulty for local governments was that the negotiation process
required the municipalities and the county to agree on the distribution
of LOST proceeds in order to file the joint certificate and have the tax
renewed. 146 Failure to file the certificate would result in revocation of
authority to hold the referendum and impose the LOST tax.147 The

136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Dover, 246 Ga. App. at 526, 541 S.E.2d at 94.
138. City of McDonough, 322 Ga. App. at 629-30, 745 S.E.2d at 832.
139. 293 Ga. 739, 749 S.E.2d 685 (2013).
140. Ga. H.R. Bill 991, Reg. Sess. (2010).
141. Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 739, 749 S.E.2d at 686; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-80 to
-96 (2013).
142. See Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 739, 749 S.E.2d at 686-87.
143. Id. at 739-40, 749 S.E.2d at 687.
144. Id.; see also Bd. of Comm'rs of Taylor Cnty. v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 257, 264
S.E.2d 193, 198 (1980).
145. TurnerCnty., 293 Ga. at 740, 749 S.E.2d at 687; see also Cooper, 245 Ga. at 257,
264 S.E.2d at 198.
146. Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 740, 749 S.E.2d at 687.
147. Id. at 740, 749 S.E.2d at 688.
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LOST Act also required periodic renegotiation of the distribution because
148
the criteria were based, in part, on census data for the jurisdictions.
Problems arose because the jurisdictions within a special district could
not always agree on the distribution.'4 9 Prior to the amendment, the
jurisdictions participated in non-binding arbitration or some other form
of non-binding dispute resolution. 50
The 2010 amendment rewrote O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89(d),' 5 ' adding a step
to the negotiation process in the event an impasse remained after nonbinding dispute-resolution efforts.' 52 Any party to the required joint
agreement could petition the superior court in the county of the special
district to seek resolution of remaining disputed items.15 ' A judge
from outside the circuit would be appointed to hear written "best and
final offer[s]" from the county in the district on one side, and from the
"municipalities representing at least one-half [ofi the aggregate
municipal population" in the district on the other side.'54 The judge
would conduct hearings as he or she deemed necessary and would render
a decision by adopting the best and final offer of one of the parties, along
with findings of fact.'55 The final order was required to include a new
certificate to be transmitted to the revenue commissiondistribution
6
16

er.

In Turner County, the municipalities filed a petition in superior court
once an impasse was reached, as authorized in the 2010 amendment.
The county filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the 2010 amendment
on constitutional grounds. The trial court denied the motion and upheld
the constitutionality of the amendment. It also entered an order
adopting the best and final offer of the municipalities and transmitted
a new certificate to the revenue commissioner."' The supreme court
granted a petition for discretionary appeal and reversed the trial court,
the separation of powers
ruling that the 2010 amendment violated
15 8
provisions of the Georgia Constitution.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 740-41, 749 S.E.2d at 688.

150. Id. at 741, 749 S.E.2d at 688.
151. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89(d) (2013 & Supp. 2014).
152. Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 741, 749 S.E.2d at 688.
153. Id.; see also O.C.GA. § 48-8-89(d)(4), invalidatedby TurnerCnty., 293 Ga. 739,749
S.E.2d 685 (2013).
154. Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 741, 749 S.E.2d at 688.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 742, 749 S.E.2d at 688-89.
158. Id. at 743, 749 S.E.2d at 689; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. III.
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The court determined that the amended portion of O.C.G.A. § 48-889(d)(4) allowed the municipalities or the county in a district to obtain
a court order forcing the other local governments to either levy or renew
a LOST "even if the elected representatives of those governing entities
have determined the tax should be permitted to expire." 5 9 Since the
authority to levy a tax is legislative, the decision on whether to renew
a tax is legislative as well.6 0 It is a decision that should be "left solely
to the discretion of the elected legislative body."' 6'
The same is true for allocation of the tax, once the decision to levy is
made. The court followed the reasoning in Board of Commissioners of
Taylor County v. Cooper,' a LOST Act case pre-dating the 2010
amendment that considered the extent of local discretion in allocating
LOST proceeds.16 The court noted that the LOST Act did not give
specific direction on the allocation of funds, but left "the division to be
determined within certain guidelines by the municipalities and the
county." 64 The court in Turner County also relied on the supporting
rationale in Jackson v. City of College Park,1" 5 another pre-2010
amendment case. 66 In Jackson, the court of appeals noted that
"[v]oluntary agreement, not judicial decree, is the only means of
producing the necessary certificate of distribution." 7
In Turner County, the supreme court reasoned that determining the
benefit of a tax is a matter of legislative discretion and is not subject to
judicial review absent a manifest abuse of discretion. 6 ' Similarly,
determining the allocation of tax revenue is solely a matter of legislative
discretion unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. 169 The court
concluded that judicial review "may not be expanded to substitute the
court's decision for that of the parties." 70
"[T]he basic principle embodied in the separation of powers doctrine
[is] that the legislature cannot delegate legislative power to the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 743, 749 S.E.2d at 689.
Id.
Id.
245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980).
Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 743, 749 S.E.2d at 689.
Id.
230 Ga. App. 487, 496 S.E.2d 777 (1998).
Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 743-44, 749 S.E.2d at 690.
Jackson, 230 Ga. App. at 491, 496 S.E.2d at 780 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

168. Turner Cnty., 293 Ga. at 744, 749 S.E.2d at 690.
169. Id. at 744-45, 749 S.E.2d at 690.
170. Id. at 745, 749 S.E.2d at 690.
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courts.""' The municipalities argued that the 2010 amendment was
a proper delegation because it only authorized the judicial branch to
ascertain facts. 72 The court rejected the argument because the judge
is required to adopt a best and final offer of one of the parties based on
the "intent" of certain sections of the LOST Act, rather than strict criteria.'7 3 Even if the judge was required to render a decision based on
the criteria, it would still be a
blatant delegation of legislative decision-making to the trial court
because it would not call for a factual determination of any fact in
dispute but a distribution of tax proceeds based upon what the judge
believes to be the appropriate weight to place upon factors74that are
expressly not limited to the criteria set forth in the statute.
The distribution was to be based on, "but not limited to," the listed
criteria. 175
In addition, the decision calls for subjective weighing of the criteria
and so is not subject to a factual determination. 6 As a result, the
allocation decision is political and cannot be delegated to a judicial
officer. 177 The general assembly specifically chose not to set rigid
standards based strictly on population, but required the local govern178
ments to negotiate an allocation based on the needs of the district.
71
As a result, the court held the 2010 amendment unconstitutional.

171. Id. at 745, 749 S.E.2d at 691 (alteration in original) (quoting Harrell v. Courson,
234 Ga. 350, 352, 216 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1975)).
172. Id. at 746, 749 S.E.2d at 691.
173. Id. at 746-47, 749 S.E.2d at 691-92.
174. Id. at 747, 749 S.E.2d at 692.
175. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89(b)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.

179. Id. at 748-49, 749 S.E.2d at 692-93.

